Skip to the page
Wednesday 30 September 2026
Trump-Casino
Big Wins

Brad Booth's Bluff Against Phil Ivey With Seven-Deuce

In 2008, Brad Booth bluffed Phil Ivey with the worst starting hand in poker. The hand went into legend. But what actually happened is more complicated than the legend suggests.

Filed 7 May 2026 · 2 min read

worst possible opening hand notation with dramatic underdog narrative victory outcome unexpected
worst possible opening hand notation with dramatic underdog narrative victory outcome unexpected

The hand took place in a mixed-game tournament. Brad Booth held seven-deuce, the worst starting hand in Texas hold'em. The odds of seven-deuce winning against any two random cards are roughly 32 percent. Against Phil Ivey, the gap widens. Ivey is a professional. Booth is also a professional. The game was mid-level buy-in, which means both were playing above replacement level.

Boards details are limited. The action was raised pre-flop. The flop came out, and Booth faced aggression. The conventional analysis says Booth's hand had almost no value. Seven-deuce rarely makes the best hand. It occasionally makes a straight if the board cooperates. But in the immediate moment, Booth was behind almost everything.

He bluffed. Betting into Ivey created a choice for Phil. Call and win showdown value, or fold and concede the hand. The bluff worked. Ivey folded. Booth won.

The Mythology Problem

The hand became famous because it featured Booth bluffing with the worst hand. In the simplified version of the story, Booth outplayed Ivey with courage and position. The truth is less clear.

Bluffing with seven-deuce requires several things to be true. First, your opponent must have more to lose by calling than by folding. This happens when Ivey's range of hands is hands that beat seven-deuce but lose to nothing. Middle-pair hands. Hands like queen-ten. Second, Booth must be in position. Position determines who acts last, which gives Booth information. Third, the board must allow plausible strength. A seven or deuce on the board helps. A completely blank board does not.

We do not know if these conditions were met. The hand is cited as legend, but the actual details are lost. Sample size of one does not support general conclusions. We would need to see Booth play this hand one hundred times to understand his edge.

What we do know is that the hand has been used as evidence of Booth's bravery. This is survivorship bias. Booth bluffed with seven-deuce and won. We do not talk about the times he bluffed with seven-deuce and lost. We do not account for the variance.

Why the Hand Matters Anyway

The hand matters because it illustrates something true about high-level poker: the strength of your cards matters less than the strength of your narrative. A player who is willing to bluff with seven-deuce is unpredictable. An unpredictable player is harder to play against. Ivey's mistake might have been that he did not know Booth had seven-deuce. If Ivey thought Booth had a genuine hand, folding was correct.

The frequency of bluffing is important. If Booth bluffs 100 percent of the time, he has no strategy. If Booth bluffs 5 percent of the time, he is too conservative. The optimal bluff frequency is determined by pot odds and your opponent's calling frequency. If Ivey folds too often, Booth should bluff more. If Ivey calls too often, Booth should bluff less.

Legends in poker are usually correct about the emotional truth and incorrect about the mechanical truth. Booth's bluff with seven-deuce was brave if it was rare and profitable. It was foolish if it was frequent and unprofitable. We will never know which.

Filed under: Big Wins, Celebrities, Poker

Pass it on: XTelegram